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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the principal constitutional functions of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ)t is to secure legitimacy2 of the European Union (EU) system of 
governance by protecting the fundamental values on which this system is 
said to rest. 3 This role of the ECJ - as a guardian of democracy, fundamental 
rights and the rule of law - is complicated by the multi-layered nature of the 
EU's sources of legal authority: the EU institutions and the law-making bodies 
of Member States (MSs), and by the heavy reliance on the co-operation of 
National Cour ts (NCs) in building up and maintaining the EU's legal system.4 
I focus on providing an overview of selected problems that are directly related 
to the ECJ's legitimising role, and I will do so from the perspective of the ECJ's 
constitutional politics. 5 
Email: bapuchalska@uclan.ac.uk. 
The current name under the Treaty of Lisbon is the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(C)F.U). I prefer to stay with the old name - ECJ. I also do not include the General C-Ourt in 
my discussion since its role is much less constitutionally salient than that of the ECJ. 
This idea is partially inspired by the writings of T. Parsons, 'The professions and social 
structure' (1939) Socia/forces, 17(4), pp. 457- 467. 
The ECJ has been credited with paying increasing attention to effective application of the 
principle of democracy in its case law, but as is widely known, this has not always been 
the case. What still remains problematic is the judicial treatment of democracy and other 
substantive constitutional principles or values in the high plane of constitutional politics of 
the EU. 
According to de Wade, there is a suggestion that the ECJ is legally obligated to steer pro-
integration course: H.D. de Waele, 'The Role of the Court of Justice in the European 
Integration Process. A Contemporary and Normative Assessment' (2010) llanse Law Review 
Vol. 6No l. 
11iis is a huge topic of which a number of aspects warrant a more in-depth investigation that 
can be provided here. Also, I will not cover issues related to the infamous 'democratic deficit', 
i.e., the well-recognised problems with popular political participation and representation, 
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I•irst, I will consider whether the alleged prioritising - by the ECJ - of the 
principles of integrity of the EU legal system and economic regulations over 
constitutional values - such as fundamental rights and democracy - amounts to 
an ideological project that undermines the legitimacy of the EU law. I will focus 
on instances where the ECJ failed to recognise concerns of the NCs related to the 
standard of protection of these values in the EU law for the sake of protecting 
its own authority and the uniformity of the EU law. Historically, these concerns 
were most famously identified in the so-called 'supremacy' challenges, but 
there was also a string of other cases where the protection of market freedoms 
clashed with fundamental rights and other constitutional principles.6 This 
period of the ECJ jurisprudence took a more rights-friendly turn in cases such 
as Omega and Schmidberger.7 The more recent NCs challenges yet again put the 
ECJ under pressure, this time because of its reluctance to recognise the higher 
standards of fundamental rights protection related to criminal trials in national 
constitutions over those existing in the EU law. The string of the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW) cases8 seems to suggest that the ECJ yet again entered a 
path of prioritising the supremacy of the EU law over substantive constitutional 
objectives. 
Secondly, I will consider if the ECJ can be said to preside over a process 
of entrenching a particular model of economic policy across the EU - in 
contradiction with the core principles of constitutional transparency and 
contestation. These issues relate directly to the fundamental nature of the 
EU Treaties as internat ional agreements, which were negotiated by the 
governments and imposed top-down on the electorate, hence lack popular 
legitimacy.9 Since the ECJ and the national courts play key roles in interpreting 
4 
and the functioning of the European Parliament vis-ti-vis the Commission and the Council. 
The sources on this topic are too numerous lo cite here. 
Compare with Lenaerts, who argued that the ECJ's interpretation of the principle of 
democracy is respectful of national traditions as well as supranational regime of the EU; K. 
Lenaerts, '1be Principle of Democracy in the Case Law of the European Court of Jus tice' 
(2013) ICLQ vol 62, April, pp. 271-315. There is obviously, a whole string of cases where the 
ECJ directly recognised and supported fundamental rights. See for instance D Chalmers, G. 
Davies & G. Monti, European Union Law: Text and Materials (CUP: Cambridge), 2014, 3nd ed. 
ch.6. See also J. Weiler & N. Lockhart, 'Taking Rights Seriously' "Seriously": 'lbc European 
Court and its Fundamental Rights Jur isprudence' (1995) 32 CMLRev. 51. 
Cases C-36/02, Omega (2004) 1-9609; and C-112/00, Schmidberger (2003) 1-5659. Cases 
such as Laval C-341/05 1'20071 ECR 1-1 1767 and Viking: International Transport Workers' 
Federation, Finish Seamen Union v Viking Line ABP (2007] ECR 1-10779 led to renewed 
concerns about the ECJ's priorities, but did not undermine the overall trend. 
See for instance: C-399/11, Melloni (2013]. 
This is a rather sweeping claim, but, I believe it should be accepted, as it captures a key 
tension at the heart of EU constitutional set tlement. The simple fact is that all the basic 
provisions of the Treaties were decided with the exclusion of the electorates of the MSs - due 
to the international nature of the EU Treaties. The negotiat ions of the Treaties on accession, 
and access ion referenda could not be reasonably considered as capable of rectifying this 
shortcoming. See for instance: J. Zielonka, 'Europe as empire: the nature of the enlarged 
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and enforcing treaty provisions and by-passing national parliaments in this 
process, it can be argued that the courts contribute to further shrinking of the 
scope for democratic scrutiny and contcstation, deepening the already weak 
legitimacy of the EU law.10 Arguably, this problem is particularly acute in areas 
of economic policy, as illustrated in cases where the courts enforce seemingly 
technical rules that in reality are democratically salient - such as those created 
by administrative agencies - under the non-legislative procedure regulated by 
article 290 TFEU. t1 
In the last section, I briefly outline the most disturbing aspects of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and 
the EU currently being negotiated, that is the Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) - a judicial process of doubtful constitutional legitimacy. 
Overall, I argue that the ECJ's constitutional politics might be seen as 
amounting to a type of ideological project that the ECJ uses as a way to 
legitimise the EU legal system which, on balance, prioritises the maintenance 
of efficient jurisdictional order across the EU over substantive principles of 
democratic governance - despite challenges from national constitutional 
courts (CC).12 Furthermore, I suggest that the ECJ's persistence in promoting 
such ideology might have created a self-reinforcing dynamics; by defining ::-lC 
challenges as threats to EU law uniformity, the ECJ concentrates on dispelling 
such threats and fails to refocus its attention towards substantive constitutional 
concerns. Additional challenges to democracy and constitutionalism in the EU 
comes from specific choices of economic policy enshrined in the EU Treaties 
and the way these are interpreted and developed by the EC] and NCs. With 
some exceptions13 these choices amount to a particular model of economic 
policy that has been entrenched without much popular or parliamentary 
debate, and which depends on the active and essential support of the courts. 
10 
II 
12 
1) 
European Union' (2006) Central European Review of International Affairs, 27, 135. G. lvaldi, 
'Beyond France's 2005 referendum on the European constitutional treaty: Second-order 
model, anti-establishment attitudes and the end of the alternative European utopia' (2006) 
West European Politics, 29(1), 47-69. 
Conflicting national Jaw is to be 'set aside' or disapplied according to Simmental II, Case 
C-106177 (1978] ECR 1-629. 
Lenaerts uses the term 'other forms of governance' to describe the process of administrative 
agencies rule-making function. See note 6 above, p. 271. 
Weiler famously stated: '(t]his need for a successful market not only accentuates the pressure 
for uniformity, but also manifests a social (and hence ideological) choice which prizes 
market efficiency and European-wide neutrality of competition above other competing 
values' in:). Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe' (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal, p. 2478. 
Seen. 6. 
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2. THE ECJ AND NATIONAL COURTS: POWER 
STRUGGLE OR COOPERATION? 
2.1. EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS OWN MASTER?14 
The preliminary reference procedure contained in Article 267 TFEU15 has been 
hailed as the 'jewel in the Crown of the ECJ jurisdiction'.16 It is undoubtedly 
a cornerstone of the EU legal system, the very survival and development of 
which - according to the ECJ's discourse developed in the early constitutional 
cases - crucially depend on its smooth operation. Article 267 is also the main 
mechanism determining important aspects of the relationship between the 
ECJ and NCs. More recently, this relationship has moved from horizontal and 
bilateral to more steadily vertical and multilateral.17 This is mainly due to two 
factors: the doctrine of acte clair, which, in effect, makes it very difficult for the 
national courts to avoid making a reference under threat of Francovich action for 
damages or Article 258 TFEU infringement action, and, also, the fact that ECJ 
judgements under Article 267 have become binding on all courts across the EU, 
even retrospectively.18 Yet, the normal function that it is ascribed to any court 
hierarchy, that of appeals and reviews of judgements, is limited in relation to 
ECJ, and not available at all under Article 267 TFEU. 
This lack of availability of appeals against the ECJ's preliminary ruling is 
coupled with the weak mechanism of control over the ECJ power per se. It is dear 
that the Council and the European Parliament can overrule the ECJ by legislating 
against its decisions, but this is not the most effective system of constitutional 
checks and balances over the court. Caldeira and Gibson suggested that the ECJ 
is the 'least accountable EU institution'.19 Alter20 outlined two approaches to 
understanding the ECJ's position: legal and neo-functionalist scholars consider 
the EC] as enjoying a significant autonomy, as it can, in principle, overrule the 
interest of MSs, whereas neo-realist claim that in fact, the political control over 
the court exercised by the MSs means that ECJ is dependent on the governments 
of the powerful MSs and must heed their interests. The neo-realist positions 
seem only weakly applicable; the early interference of politicians attempting to 
instruct the NCs to ignore the ECJ's jurisdiction should be seen as consigned to 
the past - the national judges have proved to be much too keen to enforce the 
11 
15 
16 
Ii 
18 
19 
20 
6 
For an overview of the debates and literature on the ECJ's activism, see e.g. de Waele, note 4. 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 83, 30 Mar. 2010. 
P. Craig & G. De Burca, 'EU Law: Text, Cnses and Materials' (2008) (OUP), p. 460. 
P. Craig & G. De Burca, p. 461, note 42. 
Case C-2106 Kempeter v. Ilauptzollant Ilnmburg-Jonas (2008] ECR I-411, para. 39. 
G.A. Caldeira & J.I. Gibson, 'The legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union: 
Models of institutional support' (1995) 89 American Political Science Review, No. 2, 356-376. 
K.J. Alter. 'Who are the "Masters of the Treaty?": European Governments and the European 
Court of Justice' (1998) 52 lnternational Organization I, pp. 121- 147. 
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ECJ decisions even if that went against their governments.21 The other type of 
political control over the ECJ is the system of judicial appointments: one judge 
from each MS. But this type of oversight is only partly effective, which is due 
mainly to the different time horizons of the judges and the politicians whose 
term of office is limited and whose re-election can never be assumed. In contrast, 
the ECJ judges enjoy relative security of tenure. 22 
The issue of democratic legitimacy of the ECJ itself is an important one, given 
the court's immense power: its judgements affect more than 500 million EU 
citizens. Probably the best way to provide such legitimacy would be to subject 
the court to some form of higher judicial control. I suggest that the national 
constitutional courts might be best placed to provide the necessary system of 
checks and balances over the EC], to ensure that its claims to legitimacy rest on 
firmer foundations. If, as the evidence over the years suggests, the NCs are more 
ready to respect the higher authority of the law, often against political pressure, 
such a set-up would strengthen the legitimacy of the EU legal system in more 
than just formal sense - as evidenced by the NCs' attachment to substantive 
constitutional values in 'supremacy' and the EAW challenges.23 Nor should 
we forget that constitutional courts already enjoy supreme legal status in their 
domestic environment, which means that their authority and legitimacy might 
be resting on more solid grounds than that of ECJ's.24 However, it is clear that 
the ECJ would be very reluctant to accept such arrangements as potentially 
threatening the uniformity of the EU law, and its own position as its guardian. 
2.2. THE MAIN TENETS OF ECJ'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS 
There is an emerging body of literature claiming that the ECJ has been focussing 
disproportionately on safeguarding the legal foundations and integrity of the 
EU at the expense of substantive constitutional values and fundamental rights, 
as well as principles of democratic governance: their standard has been less than 
satisfactory over the years.25 TI1is is particularly visible on the high plane of the 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
That was the case in the UK. See for instance: McCarthy v Smith (1979] 3 All ER 325; Secretary 
of State for Transport, ex parte Factor tame Ltd (UK no2) (1991] l AC 60. 
Article 254 TFEU. 
See later. 
This idea goes against the mainstream position that treats the NCs challenges as potentially 
destructive to the EU legal order. The complexities and challenges of such an arrangement are 
numerous. For a start, there would need to be agreed set of constitutional principles and rules 
to refocus the jurisdictional objectives of the EU. See also Komarek's idea of 'constitutional 
democracy' in the EU, note 15. 
The ECJ has developed the rights of individuals under EU law in a way that can only be 
described as respectful of fundamental values of democracy and liberty, particularly in its 
jurisprudence expanding the meaning of citizenship under the EU law. This, however, does 
not negate the main argument of this paper that the type of relationship that developed 
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ECJ's constitutional politics in the way the EC} managed the NCs' challenges 
in the so-called 'supremacy' cases - and other type of legal challenges - where 
the EC} claimed to have identified a threat to jurisdictional integrity of the EU 
law. According to the EC}, the only way to avert such a threat is by the NCs' 
unconditional acceptance of the priority of judicial co-operation rooted in the 
acceptance oflimited sovereignty of national legal orders. Most recently, Albi asked 
if such priorities of the EC] might be damaging substantive constitutional values:26 
( ... ] the somewhat simplistic focus on sovereignty and co-operation, we arc 
inadvcrtenLly discarding a whole scl of oLher intrinsic values embodied by national 
constitutions, such as limiting power to ensure the protection of the individual 
against undue arbitrary interforenccs by the authorities, the protection of 
constitutional rights and civil liberties, the rule oflaw and separation of powers with 
due checks and balances, and judicial review by courts to safeguard these values. 
Albi placed her concerns in the area of the relationship between the ECJ 
and domestic courts, or, rather, in the bi-dimensional framework of 'Euro-
friendliness' or 'Euro-hostility' within which this relationship seemed to have 
developed. She blames European scholarly and public discourse for reinforcing 
this duality which results in a displacement of concerns with substantive 
constitutional values articulated by the national constitutions and CCs of 
Member States in relation to the developments in EU law. The bi-dimensional 
framework that Albi criticised is in fact very fami liar to me as a seminar tutor 
in EU law - and most likely many colleagues who teach this subject - both from 
readings of the mainstream textbooks and academic papers, but also from the 
approach taken to the way this part of the EU syllabus has been taught in my law 
school and probably in other law schools as well. 
The focus on the confrontational nature of the challenges of MSs 
constitutional courts27 to supremacy of the EU law represents the seductively 
26 
27 
8 
between the ECJ and NCs has been far from conducive to developing a joint unifying 
platform aimed al protecting the basic vJlues of democracy and human rights in the case-
law that belong 10 the 'supremacy· type of challenges. See A.T. Williams, 'Taking values 
seriously: towards a philosophy of EU Law' (2009) 29 OJLS (3), pp. 549- 577; A. Albi, 'Erosion 
of constitutional rights in the EU: A call for substantive co·operative constitutionalism' Paper 
presented al tire /ACL IX/Ir Wor/il Congress. 12-16 June 2014 in Oslo. 
Ste, for instance, case C-345/06, lle11rid1 (2009) ECR 1-1659, which raised the issue of secret 
EU rules; European Arrest Warrant system docs not allow the scrutiny of the circumstances 
on which the accusation is based, hence clashing with the core principle of Habeas Corpus; 
and perhaps the best known Solange series o( cases, followed by Banana judgement, where 
the ECJ clearly prioritised single-market regulations over concerns with human rights -
Case C-280/93 (1994) ECR 1-4973. See also: W. Sadurski, 'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional 
Courts in Central Europe - Democracy - European Union, (2008) European law /orm1a/, 
Vol. 14, No. ! , January 2008, pp. 1- 35. 
f. Weilee, 'Community, Member states (Ind European integration: is the law relevant?' (1982) 
21 /CMS: /011mal of Com111011 Mllrket S111cllcs no. l: 39- 56; J. Weiler, 'The Community ~ystem: 
the dual character of supranationalism'(l981) I YeC1rbook of Er1ropea11 law, (I), 267-306. 
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simple dynamics of a relationship between the two sides, as it draws clear lines 
of struggle for power referred to by some sources as the 'clash of the titans' or 
'clash of absolutes'28 between the EU and national constitutional orders. The 
use of expressions such as the threat of 'limiting' sovereignty by the ECJ, and 
the national courts' defences against such threats, feeds into this dynamics. 
The deceptive attraction of this type of discourse has been clearly visible in my 
classroom - it proved excellent in shaking young minds out of tutorial lethargy. 
However, that also meant that the students were much less receptive to any ideas 
that disturbed this clarity: any mention of fundamental rights or democracy 
in the context of 'supremacy' cases usually resulted in a return to indifferent 
slumber. 
Albi's argument plunges the debate on the state of the EU constitutionalism 
straight back into this messy realm as she attempts to refocus it on the principles 
that should have been placed in its heart long ago.29 She pitches ECJ's focus 
on 'sovereignty' and 'cooperation' against the relative neglect of substantive 
constitutional values. Such a construction suggests that in the relationship 
between the ECJ and national constitutional courts, both cooperation and 
sovereignty have been construed as opposing rather than complementary. The 
existing evidence suggests that this has largely been the case both historically 
and contemporarily. Crucially, it seems that the nature of 'cooperation' was 
mainly of a procedural type, emphasising a hierarchy of legal authority, rather 
than the protection of substantive principles. This omission is surprising given 
that the level of commitment to constitutional principles is strong both in the EU 
Treaties and in national constitutions. Why is it, then, that such commitments 
do not translate into a substantive platform of cooperation between the ECJ and 
NCs? I suggest that this might be due, at least in part, to the ECJ's ideologically 
driven agenda of protecting its own legal authority by constructing a unifying 
doctrine of the supremacy of EU law. 30 
The firm stance taken by the ECJ in early 'constitutional' cases on supremacy 
confirms that this might have been the case. It was obvious, then, that the EC]'s 
objective was to create an effective hierarchy of legal authority between the ECJ 
and domestic courts, despite the rhetoric of partnership and co-operation. This 
was demonstrated by the ECJ's claim that the imperative to protect the legal 
integrity of the EEC's still budding legal system could only have been secured by 
setting clear rules for resolving conflicts oflaws in a way that ensures its uniform, 
coherent interpretation and application. Another strand of this argument was 
the famous effet utile of the common-market regulatory framework. In contrast, 
values such as democracy, respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law 
28 
29 
30 
M. Kumm, 'The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in 
Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty' 2005) II European law Journal, No. 3, pp. 
262- 307. 
See also M. Kumm p. 290. 
Compare with M. Kumm p. 287. 
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- now articulated in article 2 TEU - were only gradually introduced into the 
text of the Treaties, and only relatively recently found their way into the ECJ's 
jurisdiction.31 These are notoriously contested concepts, which means that, 
understandably, their meaning and legal interpretation has been often less 
than coherent. 32 This absolves the ECJ only to some degree, as it is clear that it 
declared itself to be on the side of rule of law as applied to economic' rules and 
policy, but less inclined to show a similar commitment where democratic values 
were decoupled from economic concerns. 33 
2.3. THE ENDURING ATTRACTION OF THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ECJ 
AND NCs 
Sovereignty is a highly fluid and contested concept, and engaging in the lively 
debate over how its meaning evolves in today's globalised world34 is outside 
the scope of this paper.35 What is certain, and experientially verifiable, is the 
long endurance of this term in the language of politics and academia. The huge 
body of academic literature defining the EU as a supranational organisation 
largely refers to 'divisibility of sovereignty', 'transfer of sovereignty', 'divided 
sovereignty' and many other variations on this theme. It seems that there is no 
getting away from this concept despite growing number of scholars questioning 
its usefulness in explaining political dynamics of contemporary world. 36 I 
suggest that sovereignty had lost part of its currency in the early days of the first 
European Communities, as even then it appeared misaligned with the character 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
10 
There is a str ing of cases that confirm this suggestion. For an analysis of the most 
representative ones see for instance A.I. Williams, note 25, above, and J. Komarek, 'The Place 
of Constitutional Courts in the EU' (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review, pp. 420-
450. 
Williams p. 552, note 25 above; D. Kochenov, 'EU Enlargement and the Failure of 
Conditionality: Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law', 
Wolters Kluwer: Austin 2007. 
There are various cases that illustrate this point. See C-159/90 Grogan (1991] ECR I-4685; 
C-584/10 Kadi and Al Barakaat (2013) ECR I-6351; Laval (2007] ECR 1-11767; International 
Transport Workers' Federation, Finish Seamen Union v Viking Line ABP (2007] ECR 1-10779. 
Cases where the ECJ showed more willingness to recognise fundamental rights were mainly 
those of EU citizenship-related rights. See e.g. Grzelczyk C-184/99 (2001) ECR I-6193; Zhu 
and Chen C-200/02 (2004] ECR 1-9925. The cases of Mangold C-144/04 (2005) ECR 1-9981, 
and Kuciikdeveci C-55/07(2010] ECR 1-00365 elevated the principle of anti-discrimination on 
the ground of age to new jurisprudential heights. 
See e.g. M. Koskieniemi, 'What Use for Sovereignty Today?' (2011) Asian Journal of 
International Law l , pp. 61- 70 and sources quoted there. 
See also A. Albi, 'EU enlargement and the constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe', 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. 
See Albi's overview of the most vocal of scholars who propose new ways of looking at 
sovereignty, or express doubts about the explanatory potential of this term, pp. 122, 198- 199, 
note 25. 
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of the Communities governance structure. The 'transfer or limitation of 
sovereignty' in support of the supranational governance require relinquishing it 
or ceding it to an autonomous site of power that is discreet and self-contained. 
Yet, none of the EU law-making bodies entirely fit this description: both 
Councils (of Ministers and the European) and the Commission are populated 
by representatives of the MSs who are seasoned politicians. Only the occasional 
MEP might be elected from the general public, by then the European Parliament 
is not the primary agenda shaper in the EU. This confirms the existence of a 
firm link between the decisions taken in Brussels, Luxemburg and Strasburg 
and national capitals, despite the Treaties' provisions requiring 'independence' 
from the Commissioners. 37 There does not have to be a contradiction between 
the duty of independence from one's government, and recognising the best 
interest of the majority of the MSs comprising the Union, especially if the best 
interest of one's own country also happen to belong to this category. 
The clear lines defining the 'best interests' and 'authority' under the ECJ's 
sovereignty-determined logic, on the other hand, would require the EU 
institutions, particularly the Commission, to be completely alienated from 
national sites of political authority - a depiction which is difficult to accept as 
realistic. An alternative explanation should be created, one that would escape 
the confines of the 'sovereignty' discourse and be better suited to reflect the true 
nature of the nuanced and complex relations between the EU institutions and 
the MSs. There are few signs of this happening any time soon. Yet, the centrality 
of 'sovereignty' has many complex, and mostly negative implications, most 
serious perhaps in relation to integration politics, as it clashes with the original 
imperative to curb the sovereign power of the nation state that was one of the 
strongest political drivers behind the very idea of the European project.38 
It must therefore have been seen as disappointing that soon after the signing 
of the first Treaties, the ECJ actively resurrected 'sovereignty' as the central 
plank of its legal integration discourse in the Van Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa 
(1964) cases. That also meant that ECJ placed the sovereignty-centred narrative 
at the very heart of the two constitutional principles that these cases created -
supremacy and direct effect. The member states were told that only by limiting 
their sovereignty, albeit within limited fields, could the legal integrity of the EU 
law be sustained and protected. The ECJ failed to elaborate on the essence of the 
37 
38 
Article 17(3) TEU. 
After all, the key steps taken in the Treaties of Paris and Rome amounted to a serious assault 
on sovereignty: the transfer of control over strategic resources such as coal and steel, and 
later atomic energy to the collective entity, i.e., community of states and its supranational 
institutions (mainly then the High Authority) was aimed at removing such control from 
the sovereign prerogative of nation states. Such strategy was to lead to a new model of 
international co-operation, one that would protect Europe from military aspirations of states 
such as Germany that were blamed for the devastation of past conflicts. particularly the 
World War II. 
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concept of ' legal integrity of the EU law', but it was clear that this was the court's 
choice of the legitimising principle rather than fundamental rights, democracy 
or the rule oflaw. 
The ECJ's emphasis on limiting national sovereignty in those early years is 
surprising, but to a degree understandable, since sovereignty has been associated 
with all sorts of anti-communal, anti-cooperative, qualities, 39 hence tempering 
such tendencies was rightly seen as a priority for the budding 'community' of 
states. The ECJ's strategy, however, might be seen as partly rebounding - the 
overreliance on sovereignty - even when deployed to limit or control it - suffused 
the ECJ's discourse with negative semantics associated with this concept. 
The narrative of 'sovereignty' created by the EC] in the early 'supremacy' 
judgements is proving remarkably persistent, and remains strong in shaping 
the ECJ's, and the EU's constitutional politics. The relationship between the ECJ 
and national courts continues to revolve largely around this concept. Hence, 
we seem to be stuck with the narrative of 'limited sovereignty' that defined the 
terms of reference within which the relationship between the ECJ and NCs was 
to be conducted and made sense then and in the future. This kind of phrasing, 
as argued above, decisively defined this relationship as one focussing mainly 
on protection of the EU legal system by adherence to the ECJ-created doctrines 
of supremacy and direct effect.40 This was to be achieved by what the EC] 
projected as 'co-operation', yet, what in reality turned out to be the expectation 
of subservience from the NCs, and unquestioning support for the objectives 
chosen by the ECJs.41 Arguably, this demonstrates the ideological nature of the 
discourse of supremacy and direct effcct42 which is also visible in the way the 
EC] rebuked the NCs challenges to supremacy, regardless of their substantive 
grounds.43 
In contrast to NCs' concerns in relation to substantive values raised in 
supremacy cases, the EC] was much more ready to protect only those values that 
it deemed essential for the construction and successful operation of the common 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
12 
M. Koskicniemi, p. 61, note 34. 
Yet, as pointed out by a number of scholars, these two doctrines have been known in 
International Law. Sec, for instance, de Waelc, note 4. Hence, this strong justification based 
on limits to sovereignty may not have been needed, as the MSs were likely to accept both 
anyway. 
Compare with Komarek, p. 420, note 31. 
Komarek, staled: 'National Constitutional Courts [ ... ) are gradually marginalised by the 
EC)'s decisions, which follow a rather dogmatic approach to the principle of primacy and 
direct effect', p. 420, note 31. 
There is no need to rehearse here the well-known saga from the Solange I & II, through 
Brunner, Cars/en to the Polish and Czech challenges. See also Gauweiler 2 BvE 2/08 (2010) 
3 C.M.1 •. R. 13 & Re Ilo11eywell 2 BvR 2661/06 [2011) I C.M.L.R. 33. The common thread 
connecting these case is the questioning of EU commitments to democracy, fundamental 
rights and constitutionalism. 
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market - a long-term objective of the EU.44 Prioritising those values contributed, 
in some degree at least, to the displacement of concerns with democracy and 
fundamental rights.45 There was a strong rationale behind this: on a practical 
level, any weakening of the uniform application and interpretation of the EU 
law could potentially weaken the common market regulations - by giving rise to 
distortions of competition and discriminations between economic operators.46 
From a theoretical perspective, such an incursion would have been likely to 
weaken the legitimising strategy of the ECJ, who assumed the role of seemingly 
neutral enforcer and guardian of the Treaties, which, after all represent a 
political and constitutional settlement between the MSs. 
The type of legal stance taken by the ECJ on supremacy, described by Allott47 
as 'self-serving and self-referential,' had not been well suited to encourage a 
frank exchange of views and challenges that could help clarify the Jaw and foster 
mutual learning between the European court and the NCs. It also largely failed 
to steer the relationship bet1Neen the courts towards tempering the early hostility 
of national courts to preliminary reference procedure.48 In other words, the 
focus was predominantly on quashing the potential dissent that could threaten 
the hierarchy of judicial power and legal integrity of the EU, at the expense of 
what should have been the substant ive concerns of the courts.49 Simply, this can 
be taken as if the ECJ was saying to the national courts 'We could not trust you 
to co-operate on raising the level of substantive rights protection, as we suspect 
that you would abuse such co-operation for your own domestic ends.' This stance 
of the ECJ also suggests the limited nature of the EU's legal integrity promoted 
by the ECJ as mainly one of a procedural variety, in areas other than common 
market. 
Could matters have taken a different turn? I suggest that they could have. This 
is obviously a purely speculative argument, but developing some relevant points 
should help to seek a more productive way of promoting the core constitutional 
principles in the EU through the judicial process, while preserving the 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
See note 33 for a selection of cases illustrating this point. See also Wiliams's analysis of some 
of the most recent cases in note 25. 
Williams p. 570, note 25. 
Williams, p. 562, note 25. 
P. Allou. 'Globalisation from Above' in The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the 
State, CUP, Cambridge 2002. 
On this point see for instance: K.J. Aller, 'Who are the "Masters of the Treaty?": European 
Governments and the European Court of Justice' (1998) 52 International Organization l, pp. 
121-147. 
In this sense, the challenges focussed more on establishing the 'ultimate (legal] authority' 
in the EU. Compare with Poiares Maduro, 'Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional 
Pluralism in Action', in N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition Hart, 2003, 501, at 
502; N. Walker, 'Late Sovereignty in the European Union', in Walker (1999: 3-32); N. 
MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999; M. Kumm, 
'The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before 
and after the Constitutional Treaty' (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262. 
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imperatives of EU legal integration and protecting the foundations of common 
market. 
In order for this to happen, however, the legitimising role of the ECJ, NCs and 
national constitutions should be more openly accepted. But equally, the principle 
of co-operation between the courts must be recast in line with a different 
organisational approach. Mutual trust and respect should replace the emphasis 
on sovereignty to make way for mutual learning and rallying around substantive 
values and principles. Most of all, however, this would require the legitimising 
ideology promoted by the ECJ to be more balanced and more receptive to the 
concerns raised by the NCs in 'supremacy' cases. so 
2.4. BEYOND 'SOVEREIGNTY': POWER STRUGGLE, OR 
POWER-POSTURING? 
A closer look at the way in which supremacy and direct-effect doctrines have 
operated over the years reveals a slightly different picture than the sovereignty-
focussed analysis allows. Instead of a full-on confrontation, the so-called power 
struggle never amounted to more than mere posturing between the ECJ and NCs 
- that is, in essence, closer to full co-operation and acceptance of the supremacy 
of the ECJ and the EU law by the national courts, although, seemingly, on 
their own terms.51 The Treaty of Lisbon Declaration 17; the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (CFR); the Opinion of the Council Legal Service52 - these 
all reinforce the perception that the MSs' senior courts accept the primacy of EU 
law.53 A number of new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty offer conflict-diffusing 
clauses by stressing mutual respect and sincere co-operation.54 Still uncertain, 
though, are the types of value-choices and policy priorities that will underpin 
this type of co-operative framework. 
A dark shadow of doubt about such value-choices of the ECJ has been cast 
in a number of ECJ decisions in the following areas:55 secret and unpublished 
legislation, 56 EU Data Retention Directive 2006/2457 cases related to market 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
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Albi 2014, note 25. 
Chalmers, Davis and Monti concluded that the 'primacy {of the EU law] now represents 
the political consensus as to the status of EU law', p. 188, note 6. They further consider 
three approaches that have emerged in relation to the internal authority of the EU law: 
European constitutional sovereignty, unconditional national constitutional sovereignty and 
constitutional tolerance which dominates. On this point, see also Kumm, p. 285, note 29. 
EU Council Doc. 11197107, 22 June 2007. 
See also A. Dyevre European Integration and national Courts: Defending Sovereignty under 
Institutional Constraints? (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review pp. 139- 168. 
Articles 4(2) and 4(3) of the TEU 2009. 
Albi, n. 25. 
For instance, Case C-345/06 Heinrich 12009] ECR 1-1659. 
C-594/12 Seitlinger and Others. 
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regulations where substantive rights clashed with common market imperative58 
and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).59 Let me briefly discuss the last 
example. 
A number of concerns have been raised by several NCs in relation to the 
EAW. Some of the most serious concerns focused on the potential breaches of 
the right to a fair trial, presumption of innocence, retroactivity, double jeopardy, 
judgements in absentia.60 The common thread discernible in the ECJ's responses 
is a tendency to avoid directly addressing the issue,61 or to reject the possibility 
to grant a due level of protection guaranteed under national constitutions - as 
in the case of Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal. That is despite Article 53 of the EU 
CFR guarantee: 'Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or 
adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised [ ... ] 
by [ ... ] the Member States' constitutions.'62 
Can the NCs trust the ECJ to find a more viable balance between democratic 
and constitutional principles and the EU law integrity? The Treaty of Lisbon 
adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the promise of accession 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) contained in Article 6(2) 
TEU63 seem to suggest that this might indeed be the case. However, new concerns 
have been raised by the ECJ's Opinion 2/13 on the compatibility with the EU law 
of the draft agreement for EU accession to the European Convention of Human 
Rights, delivered on 18 December 2014. In this document, the ECJ concluded 
that the accession agreement is not compatible with the EU law. The reasons 
for this incompatibility given by the Court relate almost entirely to the alleged 
special nature and autonomy of the EU law, and the position of the Court itself, 
as the only judicial body authorised to interpret the EU law - a role that could 
be threatened by the binding nature of the European Court of Human Rights 
interpretation of the ECHR. The EC]'s concerns in relation to the draft agreement 
might be resolved and accession could be achieved. However, by focussing so 
strongly on preserving its own position of power as the highest arbiter of the EU 
legal order and by stressing the special nature and position of EU law, the Court, 
once again, placed its priorities on the wrong side of constitutional politics: in 
preservation of judicial power as a key factor in safeguarding the unity of the EU, 
rather than on upholding substantive standards of fundamental rights. Is seems, 
then, in light of Opinion 2113, that the prospects for development of the ECJ-led 
S8 
S9 
60 
6l 
62 
63 
Seen. 34. 
See the case of Melloni, n. 8. 
See V. Mitsilegas, 'General Report: The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice from Amsterdam 
to Lisbon. Challenges of Implementation, Constitutionality and Fundamental Rights' (FIDE: 
2012). Available at: www.fidc2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=90; See also Albi, n. 25. 
D. Sarmiento, 'European Union: the European arrest warrant and the quest for constitutional 
coherence' (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1, 177- 178. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), 14 December 2007. 
See also: CoE Final Report to the CDDH 47+1(2013)008 rev2. 
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substantive constitutionalism appears to have diminished even further. This is 
particularly unfortunate in the current climate of growing Euro-scepticism and 
the potential paralysis of the European Parliament, which has been populated 
by a sizable fraction of MEPs representing political formations on the far-right 
political spectrum, and also hostile to the very idea of European integration. 
3. THE SUPREMACY OF EU ECONOMIC POLICY 
In this section I suggest that part of the EC]'s legitimising strategy is to deploy 
a particular type of ideology which projects the economic common market 
regulations as coherent and consistent, hence well serving the overall objective 
of EU integration. Such a strategy, however, might be hiding the underlying 
policy choices and protecting those from democratic scrutiny and oversight64 as 
they could be smuggled into the body of EU law under the guise of technical 
rules contained in secondary legislation, known as 'non-legislative acts'.65 
Since such rules, supposedly, do not entail policy choices (as they are only 
'supplementary', or amending the 'non-essential elements of the legislative acts') 
they are not subjected to the same scrutiny as the legislative acts. A number of 
reforms over the years partly addressed th is concern - those culminated in the 
European Parliament's power of veto, both stopping the adoption of such an act 
and revoking delegation.66 Still of concern, however, are rules that are not very 
likely to register on the EP's radar, such as those presented as purely technical 
and created by administrative agencies. Despite these shortcomings in the 
democratic oversight, those rules have the same binding power in domestic law 
as 'legislative acts' through the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect. 
Let us recall that one of the most significant effects of the doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect was the opening up of national jurisdictions to 
the reception of EU law. The operation of these two doctrines is supported and 
complemented by the preliminary reference procedure. These three legal devices 
combined place the national courts in position of enforcers of the EU law over 
and above conflicting national law, under the supervision of the EC].67 Since 
internal-market law is by far the widest in scope and impact of all the types of 
EU legal regulations,68 and since its main aim is to integrate national markets 
64 
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The besl·known examples where such inconsistencies are visible are the CAP and the bail-
outs of the banks across the EU in the wake of financial crisis. Discuss ion of these two 
phenomena is outside the scope of this paper. 
Article 290 TFEU. 
Article 290 TFEU. 
Compare with D. Nicol 1he constittition(ll protection of capitalism, Oxford, Oregon, Harl 
Publishing 2010. 
A. Follesdal and S. Hix 'Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone 
and Moravcsik' (2006) 44 ]CMS: journal of Common Market Studies no. 3 pp. 533- 562, at 11. 
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into a single EU one, it follows that the national courts were placed in a position 
to play a key role in transforming and integrating the economies of the Member 
States in line with the policy choices of the EU institutions, and, even more 
crucially, under the control of the ECJ. 
The key role that the national courts play in protecting the integrity of the 
EU legal system and in enforcing the individual rights under EU law gives the 
courts the power to override their own parliaments, particularly in cases when 
domestic provisions fall short of, or conflict with, the EU standard of legal 
protection. What is more, national courts are empowered to create rights and 
obligations not available under domestic law, including domestic constitutions.69 
Since most of such instances are, either directly or indirectly, related to 
economic law and policy, this activity of the courts amounts to assisting in the 
entrenchment of certain tenets and ideas underlying the EU Treaties regulation 
of that nature.70 Such entrenchment raises a number of important questions 
related to constitutional and democratic standards of economic law- and policy-
making in the EU, since it commits the national courts to act as guardians of 
an economic model that has in effect been placed outside democratic control, 
contestation and debate of the MSs' electorates.71 The key role in this process is 
played by the ECJ,72 which has the ultimate authority in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties.73 
3.1. WHAT IS THE MODEL OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
ENTRENCHED IN THE TREATIES? 
Article 3(3) TEU commits the EU internal market to be based on 'highly 
competitive social market economy'. Both in law and in practice this broad 
commitment translates into priority of competition and privatisation. These t'wo 
objectives underpin the vast majority of policies that can be described as core 
within the EU Treaties: the four freedoms provisions within the internal market 
and competition law, rules governing state aid and public procurement. These 
objectives are often described as 'neoliberal'.74 (Common Agricultural Policy 
is the one glaring exception here, its persistence often explained by the power-
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
Caldeira & Gibson, note 19. 
See Article 48 TEU, which io effect entrenches the Foundation Treaties. 
See also n. 9. 
According to Article 225(3), the General Court also has the power of hearing article 267 
TFEU preliminary references, but this has not yet been made operational. 
Article 19 TEU. 
1 am using this concept in a theoretically unsophisticated way, as denoting the possibility of 
extract ing commercial value from any type of human endeavour. See also Nicol, note 67. The 
exceptions are the interventionist policies of the CAP. and the recent bail-out of the banks 
in some MSs. But, these can be understood as an unorthodox application of neoliberalism, 
which is used to promote certain type of private interest, even if this goes against the free· 
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politics in the EU, particularly in the early years after the signing of the Treaty 
of Rome.)75 There are, obviously, a number of Treaty provisions and ECJ case-
law examples where objectives other than of the free-market nature are, at least 
theoretically, permitted to shape the law and policy. But, even those are relatively 
few. All in all, it would be difficult to dispel the suggestion that the pursuit of 
economic objectives in EU law and policy 'outweighs the taking into account of 
social concerns'76 
3.2. THE ECJ AND THE EU'S 'DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT' 
The issues identified above relate directly to the EU's infamous 'democratic 
deficit'.77 However, a serious weakness of the democratic-deficit debate is the 
narrow focus on standards of democracy considered within the traditional 
divide of public/private, in line with the dominant neo-liberal views, which 
exclude market economy - considered as private - from democratic scrutiny.78 
Following Nicol and Stupiot,79 among others, I argue that such an exclusion 
is no longer viable. There are a number of factors that justify this suggestion. 
The following two are probably the most pertinent: the traditional problem of 
technocratic bias in EU law making, particularly under article 290 TFEU; and 
the Eurozone crisis, which led to the ousting from power of democratically 
elected governments in Italy and Greece, driven by the need to implement 
economic austerity measures by technocrats.so The latter provided a shocking 
reminder that economy and politics - even when relating to the governance 
of MSs, hence of constitutional nature - must be seen as closely interwoven; 
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market principles of limited intervention in the economy, as suggested by D. Harvey, A brief 
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Mainly the French leverage. 
Lenaerts, n. 6, p. 274. 
Sources on this topic are too numerous to mention here. The most famous is the debate 
between A. Moravcsik, 'Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union' (2002) JCMS: Journal 
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According to Supiot, at stake here is much more than the 'familiar practice of privatizing 
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turmoil: Enter the technocrats' in the Financial Times, 11 November 2011, available at: www. 
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Apr. 2014). 
l ntersent ia 
I. Democracy in Cooslitutioual Politics of European Courts 
the powerful effects of the EU law on shaping not just the economic, but also 
political orders of the MSs became clearly visible. In the case of the former, the 
very nature of the market-regulation measures, including those enacted under 
Article 290 TFEU, illustrate the impossibility of separating economic and non-
economic considerations from the broader objectives of public policy. SI 
It is therefore necessary to extend lhe democratic-deficit debate to the whole 
of EU law and policy-making, including internal-market regulation, against the 
current position which prevents market regulation from being 'politicised', in line 
with the assertion that scientific and economic issues involved in market regulation 
'are a matter of technical competence more than political choices'.82 An outcome 
of such an approach is that the technical, science-based rationales are often 
prioritised over ethical, environmental, or public health concerns, which cannot 
be backed by hard scientific data either because such data is not yet available, or 
because the nature of such concerns makes it impossible to express them in strictly 
scientific terms. As illustrated by the Austrian GMOs case, this often results in the 
marginalisation of this type oflegitimate 'non-scientific' concerns.83 
The reasons for this are complex. According to Chalmers et al.: 
'the adoption of the distinction between the questions of fact (what is the risk?) and 
value (what should be done about it?) has led to the exclusion of the vast majority of 
public concerns from the most influential stage of the decision-making model: the 
process of risk framing.'84 
This is partly the result of the key role played by the technocratic agencies in 
both framing the issues under consideration and influencing actual policies by 
supplying expert advice and scientific data. Yet, those agencies are not always 
neutral and objective,85 hence, their advice might be biased. In fact, there is 
evidence to suggest that the agencies might be seen as conduits for private 
interests not always subjected to sufficient political control: 
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Charged with market entry/exit regulation and more general, informal, information-
gathering and policy-informing duties, the new European agencies apparently meet 
The Treaty itself demands such a fusion in Article 7 TFEU, which states that ' the Union shall 
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Articles 8-17 & 114 TFEU identify most of those objectives. 'The Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) which is currently negotiated, arguably, blurs such division 
even further. 
Chalmers, n. 6, p. 704. 
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ECR 1-7141. 
Chalmers, n. 6, p. 703. See also M. Kriticos, Traditional Risk Analysis and Releases of GMOs 
into the European Union: Space for Non-Scientific Factors (2009) 44 European l.aw Review, 
p. 405. 
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a purely technical demand for market-corrective and sector-specific regulation. 1his 
seemingly technocratic and semi-autonomous status implicitly provides market 
interest with a voice [ ... ) Notwithstanding their placement under the Commission's 
institutional structure [ ... ] varying degree of budgetary autonomy and direct 
networking with national administrations largely shields these agencies from 
explicitly political processes.86 
Given that the Commission is duty-bound to seek and to follo>v the advice of 
the agencies, 87 this places the agencies in a position to shape EU policy and law-
making without much political scrutiny.SS, 89 It means that large areas oflaw and 
policy-making are, indeed, excluded from political debate and contestability, 
indicating a critical shortfall in democratic credentials. Moreover, as argued 
earlier, the scope and focus of existing debate on the EU democratic-deficit is too 
narrowly oriented at issues not directly linked to this particular aspect of the EU 
functioning. 
3.3. ENTRENCHMENT OF THE EU ECONOMIC POLICY, 
TTIP, AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
3.3.1. Democratic deficit of economic policy and the courts 
These weaknesses of political scrutiny over some key areas of EU law and 
policy-making, particularly related to the internal-market regulations, are not 
satisfactorily addressed by the Courts. In fact, the opposite might be the case: 
for instance, the ECJ's interpretation of exceptions under Article 114 TFEU in 
the Austrian GMOs case suggests that the court allowed the parties to rely on 
exceptions within this article only under very strict conditions, one of which 
is 'new scientific evidence'. According to the ECJ, no sufficient new scientific 
evidence was provided for the existence of unique ecosystems in this case. 
Even if the court's textual interpretation was correct, it failed to take into 
account that phenomena such as ecosystems are not easily quantifiable, and that 
there is no hard scientific evidence to support the claim of their uniqueness. That 
is partly due to the fact that the judgement of what is and what is not a unique 
ecosystem is also closely bound to ethics and social values. Yet, by adopting its 
position, the court found itself endorsing the limited understanding of complex 
86 
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phenomenon, one that is based on the only available, narrowly defined 'scientific 
evidence'. 
One of the most complex challenges within the EU internal-market law is 
how to achieve a balance between the free-market imperative and public-policy 
goals and interests. Arguably, the ECJ struggles to get this balance right, as 
demonstrated in a string of cases within this field, including public procurement, 
and state-aid rules.90 This might be seen as reflecting the ECJ's narrow and 
predominantly economic approach to harmonisation of EU internal market law. 
a. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United 
States and the EU, which is currently being negotiated, might contribute to 
further tipping the balance towards prioritising purely economic objectives (at 
the expense of the public interest ones) in the way that EU and national Jaw is 
interpreted and enforced. Its Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)91 allows 
businesses and corporations to sue governments when their commercial interests 
are threatened by public-interest regulation . .Moreover, the ISDS enables foreign 
investors to circumvent domestic legal processes and sue host governments 
in third-party arbitration tribunals for unfair or discriminatory treatment, 
bypassing domestic laws and regulations, and hence, domestic parliaments. 
Yet the need to protect the commercial interests of companies means that 
the hearings are held in secret by panels of corporate lawyers, without the 
usual safeguards provided by an open trial in domestic courts. Citizens and 
communities affected by decisions have no legal standing to challenge such 
decisions.92 
The details of the ISDS under the TTIP are still being negotiated. However, 
what is clear is that the main challenge of running this mechanism will be to 
find a way of reconciling public-interest-driven objectives and the commercial 
interests of the investors. If the ISDS will be based on a strict application of 
contractual agreement in a black-letter, legalistic manner, which demands 
equality in the eyes of the law, and objective, neutral application of the rules, 
the public interests regulation will almost certainly be vulnerable to be trumped 
by commercial interests. The democratic underpinnings of state regulation will 
be immaterial in this type of proceedings. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
90 
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agreement, 2013, available at: www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joscph-c--stiglitz-on-
the-dangers-of-bilateral-investment-agreements (accessed 27 April 2014). 
Intersentia 21 
Bogusia Puchalska 
imagine open-ended clauses being accepted by corporations in their contractual 
agreements with governments that would protect democratically legitimate, but 
commercially unviable solutions. 
All in all, this new development including the ISDS in the TTIP will 
create a new layer of judicial authority in the EU, which might prove the most 
controversial to date when it comes to deepening the democratic deficit in 
enforcement of economic law and policy. 
In the light of the above, it can be argued that the ECJ, the national courts 
and the panels under the ISDS mechanism all contribute, in some measure at 
least, to the enforcement of a particular model of the economic order where 
increasing areas of (mainly) economic regulations are de facto entrenched and, 
as a result, placed beyond the democratic control of the national parliaments 
and the electorate. This contributes to the wider process of 'inverting the relation 
between public and private' which leads to the 'privatization oflegal rules',93 and 
amounts to the shrinking of the public sphere and a corresponding shift of power 
towards the private sphere of market-driven interests.94 From this perspective, it 
can be argued that the ECJ and the constitutional courts of the MSs enforcing 
EU law appear more as challengers to democracy than as its defenders, at least 
on the level of constitutional legal politics in the EU. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The main purpose of this paper was to present an overview of some key 
challenges in the constitutional politics of the European courts that pitch 
constitutional principles such as democracy, fundamental rights and rule of law 
against the ECJ-created ideology of legal integrity of the EU. More specifically, I 
show that in performing its role as the guardian of the EU legal order, the ECJ is 
largely guided by the imperative to provide legitimacy for the EU legal system, 
resting on its uniformity and clear hierarchy of judicial authority, often to the 
detriment of substantive constitutionalism. Such a perspective brings into focus 
the way in which the ECJ used the concept of 'sovereignty' in structuring its 
relationship with the national and constitutional courts, diverting attention from 
substantive concerns raised by the NCs in the 'supremacy' challenges and the 
EWA cases. This discussion also suggested that the ECJ used the alleged threat 
of national 'sovereignty' to the unity of the EU, as an excuse to protect its own 
position of power and authority vis-a-vis the NCs. It seems that by doing this, 
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the EC] continues in its failure to develop a more balanced approach towards 
the twin objectives of preserving the integrity of EU law and paying attention to 
substantive constitutional principles. 
This suggests that the democratic credentials and legitimacy of the ECJ might 
be questioned from at least two perspectives: its commitment to substantive 
values in the face of market imperative and the perceived threats to the 
uniformity of EU law, and as a body that is its own master, due to an almost non-
existent system of oversight of its 'constitutional' jurisdiction. 
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